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NOTES AND COMMENTS

moral character of the petitioner.24 In addition, there was no evidence
that he had in fact ever been a member of the Communist Party.2 5 It is
therefore submitted that the question of whether past membership in
the party is a valid ground for denying one admission to a state bar was
not in issue, and that the Court thus went beyond the bounds necessary
to its decision and rendered what may be a dangerous precedent.
RIcHARD C. CARMICHAEL, JR.

Constitutional Law-egulation of Obscene Matter
Dissemination of obscene books, publications, and other materials
has been punishable both under common law' and under modern statutory law. 2 All forty-eight American states currently exercise some
form of regulation over obscene materials and extensive restrictions in
this area are imposed by the federal government.3
Toward the end of its 1957 session, the North Carolina General
Assembly enacted chapter 12274 as a supplement to existing state laws.5
The new statute is designed to suppress commerce in the obscene and
redefines "obscenity" by taking into account contemporary circumstances,
scientific and sociological knowledge.
1, In all of its essential parts, the legislation is an enactment of section
207.10 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 6 which was
tentatively approved by the institute in May 1957.7 With the adoption
of the statute, North Carolina became the first state in the union to accept this definition of obscenity.8
Fourteen days later the United States Supreme Court in Roth v.
2 Forty-two witnesses attested to Konigsberg's good moral character. Among
them were a Catholic priest, a Jewish rabbi, lawyers, doctors, professors, businessmen, and social workers. None testified that his moral character was bad or
questionable in any way.
- The only evidence that Konigsberg might have been a member of the Communist Party was the testimony of one ex-communist. However, she did not
testify that he had in fact been a member, but only that he had attended meetings
of a party unit in 1941. This was the sole basis for her belief that he was a
communist. She did not know him personally, nor was her identification of him
convincing.
1 See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscente Literature, 52 H~Av. L. REv. 40-53
(1938).
2 See Lockhart and McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. Rav. 295 (1954).
'E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-64 (1952), concerning use of the mails for sending or
receiving obscene materials, importation or sending obscene matter by common
carrier or express company, displaying obscene matter on envelopes or postcards,
and using obscene language in radio broadcasting.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 1227.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-189 to -194 (1953), as amended, § 14-189 (Supp. 1955).
'ALI Model Penal Code § 207-10 (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957).
Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 8 (1957).
8 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 13.
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United States and Albertsv. California,9 combined for hearing, held for
the first time'0 that obscenity statutes are constitutional when they are
"applied according to the proper standards for judging obscenity.""
In indicating what these "proper standards" are, the Court drew
many of its words directly from the North Carolina and American Law
Institute definition. The Court said that "obscenity" is utterance
"utterly without redeeming social importance."' 2 "Obscene material
is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest."'13 The constitutionally valid test is "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
14
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.'
But Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for five members of the Court,
emphasized that materials are not obscene merely because they deal with
sex. He said, "Sex and obscenity are not synonymous," and "the
portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press."' 5
9354 U.S. 476 (1957) affirming Roth v. United States, 237 F2d 796 (2d Cir.
1956),
and Alberts v. California, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (App. Dep't.,
1
1955.4n an earlier test of the first amendment validity of such statutes, Doubleday

& Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), affirming 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d
6 (1947), the Court had divided equally and in a per curiam opinion upheld the
New York statute. Frequent dicta has also indicated that obscene utterance is not
protected expression. E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931);
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877).
In affirming the Roth and Alberts convictions, the Court equated obscenity
with libel and pointed to evidence "sufficiently contemporaneous" with the adoption
of the first amendment "to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection
intended for speech and press." 354 U.S. at 483. For a different interpretation
of some of this evidence see the concurring opinion of the late Judge Jerome N.
Frank in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 806-10 (2d Cir. 1956).
1354 U.S. at 492.
12 Id. at 484.
1
'
3Id.at 487.
1
1Id.at 489.
5
" Id. at 487. The first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press
are made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ; Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
Included are motion pictures, writings, and other
forms of expression designed merely for entertainment. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946). Distribution as well as publication is included and
the Court has struck down licensing or censorship systems which conditioned these
rights upon obtaining prior approval. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
But in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), decided the same
day as the Roth and Alberts cases, the Court upheld the validity of a state statute
permitting the legal officer of municipalities to obtain an injunction pendente lite
against the sale or distribution of allegedly obscene materials. The statute provided
for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and required that the materials be
confiscated and destroyed upon the court's finding that they were obscene. Comparing the injunctive procedure with the criminal procedure sustained in the
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He warned that any statute attempting to regulate obscenity must
-not impose such standards that might include material which is legitiinately concerned with sex and which is constitutionally protected.' 6
While the decisions are not all that those who argue for absolute
freedom of expression in this area might have hoped for, the Court
,could hardly have been expected to open the gates to an unrestrained
flood of obscene and pornographic materials. The decisions appear to
have left this field in a better condition than that in which the Court
found it.
Courts have recognized that "the concept of obscenity remains
Alberts case, the Court concluded that the New York procedure does no more and
goes no further than the criminal statutes. Both interfere with the publication's

-distribution at precisely the same stage and in neither case need the materials have
passed into the hands of the public. Four members dissented; Chief Justice Warren
because the procedure placed the book itself on trial, and the decision was based
a"on the quality of art or literature" without taking into consideration the manner
of use, conditions of the sale, and the identity of the buyer and seller, id. at 445-46;
Justice Brennan because jury trial on the issue of obscenity was not guaranteed,
id. at 447-48; and Justices Douglas and Black because the procedure was "prior
xestraint and censorship at its worst" since an ex parte decree could be issued in
secret. They also considered the statute's authorization of a state-wide injunction
against distribution of the materials to be objectionable. The "nature of the
group among whom the tracts are distributed" was felt to have an "important
'bearing on the issue of guilt in any obscenity prosecution." Id. at 446-47.
1Id.
at 488. See also Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), unanimously
reversing a conviction under a state statute making it unlawful to sell a book
"'tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly
tending to, the corruption of the morals- of youth." The Court invalidated the
statute as not being reasonably restricted to the evil with which it attempted to
deal. "The State* insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading public
.against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield
juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare.
Surely, this is to bum the house to roast the pig." Id. at 383.
In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the Court held invalid a
statute, directed against "crime comic-books," which prohibited distribution of
"'collections of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust." The Court stated that although it could see "nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature ...

."

Id. at 510.

Censorship or "prior-restraint" problems are also sometimes raised by prose'cutors and sheriffs who furnish distributors and dealers with lists of "objectionable"
publications and order their removal with the warning that continued sales will
result in prosecution. See, New American Library of World Literature v. Allen,
114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio, 1953) (enjoining police chief who ordered removal
of publications deemed offensive) ; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292,
96 A.2d 47 (Ch. 1953), aff'd and modified, 14 N.J. 524, 103 A.2d 256 (1954) (enjoining county prosecutor who ordered removal of books from newsstands). But
cf. Sunshine Book Co. v. McCaffrey, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (refusing
injunction.).
See also reports of sheriffs in at least three North Carolina counties ordering
mewsdealers to stop selling present, as well as future, unpublished issues of publications termed "objectionable." Greenboro Daily News, Nov. 27, 1957, § A, p. 6, col.
7-8; id., Nov. 22, 1957, § A, p. 15, col. 1; Durham Morning Herald, Nov. 2, 1957,
§ B, p. 1, col. 4-8; The Durham Sun, Nov. 1, 1957, § C, p. 1, col. 8. The restrictions were also applied to one best-selling novel, the reprint edition of Grace
Metalious's Peyton Place, Durham Morning Herald, Nov. 16, 1957, § A, p. 1,
col. 1-4. For a discussion of similar activities elsewhere, see Note, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 216 (1954); 1 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 226-28
(1947) ; CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 536-38 (1941).
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elusive,"' 17 that materials deemed to be obscene might vary from generation to generation,' 8 and that what was yesterday obscene may today be
acceptable, 19 or vice versa. 20 Nevertheless, the term "obscene" has
generally been considered to be of sufficient definiteness to support a
21
criminal prosecution.
2
No legal definition of obscenity is likely to be entirely satisfactory. Too many facttrs are involved, ranging from indecent language-as
offensive words written in public places 2 --to ideological obscenity-as
the advocacy of changes in accepted sexual standards or institutions
contrary to the policy of the state,24 and including materials which are
thought to have a harmful effect on the reader's sexual thoughts, desires,
25
and possibly activity.
Various standards for determining obscenity have been applied, but
courts have generally followed one of two major tests. Earlier cases
26
adopted a rule promulgated in the English case of Regina v. Hicklin,
which called for a determination of the material's effect upon children
and sexually susceptible and perverted individuals. Under the Hicklin
1" American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d. 334, 343, 121 N.E.2d
585, 590 (1954).
' See Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); People v.
Miller, 155 Misc. 446, 279 N.Y. Supp. 583 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1935).
1" See United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1913).
" See United States v. One Unbound Volume of a Portfolio, 128 F. Supp 280
(D.C. Md. 1955).
21 "Everyone who uses the mails . . . must take notice of what, in this enlightened age, is meant by decency, purity, and chasity in social life, and what
must be deemed obscene, lewd, and lascivious." Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S.
29, 42 (1896).
" See 1 CHAFEY GOVERNMENT AND MASS COmmUNICAroNS 200-18, for a
discussion of the difficulties in giving "obscenity" a legal definition.
2 See Pascagoula v. Nolan, 183 Miss. 164, 184 So. 165 (1938) (coarse words
written on side of automobile held obscene).
24 See Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York University, 305
N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 587 (1954)
(fact that film "La Ronde,' based on Schnitzler's Reigen, did not condemn the
adultery it described was an important consideration in concluding that film was
"immoral" and would "tend to corrupt morals") ; People v. Friede, 133 Misc.
611, 233 N.Y. Supp. 565 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1929). (Radclyffe Hall's The Well
of Loneliness held obscene because subject matter was "offensive to decency".)
"[U]nder the statute . . . punishment is apparently inflicted for provoking
... undesirable sexual thoughts, feelings, or desires." United States v. Roth, 237
F2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion) ; "The meaning of . . .'obscene'
...is: Tending to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and lustful
thoughts." United States v. "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
28 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).
The test was said to be "whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort
may fall."
The rule was followed in numerous American decisions, e.g.. United States v.
Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,571, at 1103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); Knowles v.
United States, 170 Fed. 409 (8th Cir. 1909) ; United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed. 732
(E.D. Mo. 1889); Commonwealth v. Friede. 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930) ;
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346, 86 N.E. 910 (1909) ; People v. Pesky,
254 N.Y. 373, 173 N.E. 227 (1930), aflinming 230 App. Div. 200, 243 N.Y. Supp
193 (1st Dept. 1930).
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rule, an entire book might be condemned because of selected excerpts or
passages. 27 The test was criticized, 28 fell into disrepute, and was finally
rejected by the Court in the Roth case as "unconstitutionally restrictive
of the freedoms of speech and press. ' 29 Later cases have tended to
follow rules which developed out of the litigation involving the importation of James Joyce's novel, Ulysses." These more recent decisions
have considered the book as a whole, tried to determine its predominant
effect, and condemned the publication as obscene only upon finding that
its tendency to arouse the sexual desires of the average, normal reader
was so substantial as to outweigh whatever artistic, literary, scientific or
other merits it might possess. 31
However, central to both definitions was the idea that obscene publications were of a type that excited certain sexually stimulating thoughts
in the minds of readers and that by doing so corrupted and depraved
them.
Phrasing of the definition in these terms has caused courts and
writers to advance various forceful arguments against governmental
27 See New York v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947),
aff'd on other grounds, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of
Hecate County held obscene because of chapter, "The Princess with the Golden
Hair") ; Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930) (Theodore
Dreiser's An American Tragedy held obscene because of selected portions);
United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,571, at 1103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879)
(jury told to convict if "any" of the "marked passages .. . are obscene").
8In United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), Judge
Learned Hand, although he applied the Hicklin rule because of its earlier acceptance by the federal courts, protested, characterized it as "mid-Victorian," and
stated that "it seems hardly likely that we are . . . so lukewarm in our interest
in letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex
to the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few ......
Judge Curtis Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 125 (Q.S.,
1949) aff'd sub nonr. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d
389 (1950), argued that "strictly applied, this rule renders any book unsafe, since
a moron could pervert to some sexual fantasy to which his mind is open the
listings in a seed catalogue."
20 354 U.S. at 489.
7°United States v. "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934).
2 "iT]he work must he taken as a whole, its merits weighed against its defects ... ; if it is old, its accepted place in the arts must be regarded; if new, the
opinions of competent critics in published reviews or the like may be considered;
what counts is its effect, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom
it is likely to reach." United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
Examples of cases following this standard include Walker v. Pepenoe. 149 F.2d
511 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ;
United States v. Levine, supra; Attorney General v. "Serenade," 326 Mass. 324,
94 N.E.2d 259 (1950); Attorney General v. "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281,
93 N.E.2d 819 (1950); Attorney General v. "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81
N.E.2d 663 (1948); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840
(1945) ; Bantam Books Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (Ch. 1953)
modified and aff'd, 14 N.J. 524, 103 A.2d 256 (1954).
But cf. Besig v. United States. 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) affirinig United
States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (D.C. Cal. 1951) ; Burstein v. United
States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949) ; State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d
283 (1954).
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regulation of obscene materials. They have argued (1) that for either
a state or the United States lawfully to interfere with speech or press
by suppressing an allegedly obscene publication it must first be shown
that there is a "clear and probable"8 2 danger that overt criminal activity
or serious antisocial conduct would result from the distribution of the
publication,33 (2) that actually there are no reliable scientific or sociological studies of the effects of obscenity on behavior although such legislation rests upon the assumption that reading these materials will induce
misconduct. Available studies seem to indicate that the individual who
is susceptible will be affected by whatever else is available. Present
day society is one which accepts a great deal of erotic appeal, and, aside
from books and other publications, innumerable other matters arouse
normal sexual thoughts and desires with greater frequency. Hence, in
the absence of data connecting obscenity with misbehavior, restrictions
on publications appear to be neither reasonable nor appropriate; (3)
that the function of criminal law is to punish behavior which falls below
accepted community standards, not to regulate thoughts and desires.
Immoral acts may be prohibited, not immoral thoughts and desires. The
latter would appear to be the concern of the church or the home, but not
of government; (4) that while admittedly a line must be drawn at some
point between decency and indecency, artistry and pornography, judicial
tests which condemn materials because of their tendencies to arouse
sexual thoughts and desires are unduly restrictive of freedom of expres4
sion for serious literature dealing with sexual problems and behavior.
The American Law Institute took these arguments into consideration
in adopting a definition for its Model Penal Code. A tentative decision not to make private illicit sexual relations criminal had been made
earlier.8 5 Accordingly the Institute felt that the gist of the obscenity

" The phrase is borrowed from the sedition law where it is used to indicate
the exigency upon which advocacy may be suppressed. See Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
"See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Q.S., 1949), aff'd sub
twin. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
This view was also advocated, with some modifications, by Judge Frank in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 826 (2d Cir. 1956).
See also, Lockhart and McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitttion, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 363-68 (1954).
The argument was rejected by the Court's holding in the Roth case. As
obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, no "clear and present danger"
test applies. 354 U.S. at 485-87.
" judge Frank's lengthy concurring opinion in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d
796, 801-27 (2d Cir. 1949) presents the most recent detailed exposition of these
arguments. See also his concurring opinion in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788,
790-98 (2d Cir. 1949). And see Lockhart and McClure, supra note 33, at 358-87;
Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REv. 40, 73-76,
(1938) ;ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comments at 8, 20, 24-28 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957) ; Note, 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 305, 312-16 (1957) ; McKE ON, MERTON AND
GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ 67, 71-76 (1957).
"2ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207-10, comments, at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957).
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offense was "a kind of 'pandering'
and drafted the model statute
"to suppress commerce in the obscene. '37 Hence, the private possession,
writing, or lending to friends of obscene materials is not punishable
under the Model Code.38 In addition, the Supreme Court had granted
certiorari in the Roth case and the Institute felt that whatever the case's
outcome might be obscenity laws would have to be restricted so that they
would not include materials legitimately dealing with sex.39 Hence the
prevailing tests which defined obscenity in terms of its "tendency to
40
excite lustful thoughts" and "corrupt and deprave" were rejected,
and the following definition was adopted instead:
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of
41
such matters.
"3

The language was intended to recognize a "normal interest in
42
sexual matters, for which it should be lawful to provide satisfaction."
Further, since society tolerates much in literature, advertising, and art
which individuals or particular groups might consider to be appeals to
"prurient interest," the definition was restricted "to the prurient which

'
is disapproved by generally observed custom.

43

"Appeal to prurient interest" was said to refer to "qualities of the
material itself: the capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden
8
Ibid.
37 Id.at 13.
"Id. at 10-11.
9Id. at 13.
"0Id.at 10.
" Id. § 207-10 (2) ; N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 1227, § 1 (b). In a further discussion of "prurient interest" it is said that this "is an excerbated, morbid, or perverted
interest growing out of the conflict between the universal sexual drive of the
individual and equally universal social controls of sexual activity. The wall of
secrecy with which society has surrounded sexual behavior tends to build up in

the individual strong feelings of the shamefulness of sexuality . .

.

. Literary

or graphic material which disregards the social convention evokes 'repressiontensions'; i.e., mixed feelings of desire and pleasure on the one hand, and dirtiness,
ugliness, revulsion on the other. This is especially likely if the material is presented
in a sly, leering manner, or in vulgar terms manifestly chosen merely to shock or
titillate the reader. Devices like these, serving to remind the reader that he is
enjoying 'contraband,' make the very fact of social disapproval a source of added
excitement and attraction. Society may legitimately seek to deter the deliberate
stimulation and exploitation of emotional tensions arising from the conflict between
social convention and the individual's sex drive." ALI MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.10, comments, at 29-30 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
"Id. comments, at 29.
" Id. comments, at 10.
In order to determine whether the material exceeds these boundaries, the
statute admits evidence of "public acceptance" of the material throughout the United
States. Id. § 207.10 (2) (d) ; N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 1227 § 1 (b) (4).
One purpose of this provision was to "achieve a general and predictable policy
on obscenity, free of local or temporary distortions . . .

"

It was anticipated

that a "book could hardly be held obscene in one county of a state if it appeared
openly on public library shelves and in book stores throughout the state." ALI
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comments, at 11, 44. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
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look behind the curtain of privacy which our customs draw about sexual
44
matters."
Obviously, books and other material which may have a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts need not necessarily appeal primarily to prurient
interest. The North Carolina and Model Penal Code definition looks
to the appeal of the material, the type of appetite toward which the
publication is directed. The prevailing definitions, as pointed out, have
considered the supposed effect upon the reader's thoughts and behavior.

As a generalization, it might be said that the Code has drawn the
line between the obscene and the permissible considerably closer to the

pornographic4 5 than the heretofore existing tests.
The Model Penal Code was not directly involved in either the Roth
or Alberts cases. Both defendants had been convicted under con-

ventional statutes which as interpreted defined obscenity in terms of the
material's tendency to arouse lustful thoughts or deprave and corrupt
the reader. 46 The primary issue in both cases was the constitutionality
of these statutes47 and the obscenity of the publications involved was

not in issue.48 Nevertheless, all of the Justices appear to have been

influenced in their thinking by the Code and it is discussed in three of
49

the four opinions.
Some confusion is created by the fact that Mr. Justice Brennan, in
the majority opinion, after defining obscenity in language adapted from
the Code, stated that the trial courts "sufficiently followed"510 this

standard. He further cites as examples of applications of the Court's
definition cases which applied the prevailing test defining obscenity in

terms of the thoughts it creates in the reader.5'

Elsewhere, 2 he

"Id. comments, at 10.
""The term 'obscene' or one of its equivalents is 'often used to describe
typical under-the-counter pornography, which is, of course, not entitled to
constitutional protection." Lockhart and McClure, supra note 33, at 356. See
also Note, 6 BtrurAo L. REv. 305, 315-16 (1957), where pornography is said to be
distinguishable from obscenity "because it is deliberately designed to stimulate sex
feelings and to act as an aphrodisiac whereas an obscene book has no such
immediate and dominant purpose, although incidentally this may be its effect."
46354 U.S. at 486.
,7 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311 (1955) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952).
46354 U.S. at 481 & n. 8.
46 Although Chief Justice Warren did not specifically mention the Penal Code
in his separate concurring opinion, some of his language seems to have been at
least influenced by its provisions and his argument appears to embody the philosophy behind the model legislation. He says: "It is not the book that is on trial;
'it is a person. The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity
of a book or picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus placed in context
from which they draw color and character. A wholly different result might be
reached in a different setting." He felt that the language of the majority opinion
was too broad and noted that both defendants "were plainly engaged in the
commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with
prurient effect." He felt that both the state and federal governments could
constitutionally
punish such conduct. 354 U.S. at 494-96.
5
OId. at 489.
61 Id. at 489 & n.26.
2
Id. at 487.

19581

NOTES AND COMMENTS

substitutes a dictionary definition of "prurient interest" ("i.e., material
having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts") 53 for the American Law
Institute definition, and states: "We perceive no significant difference
between the meaning of obscenity developed in the case law and the
definition of the... Model Penal Code ....
Yet at the same time he
cites portions of the comments to the Code where the prevailing definitions were expressly rejectedY5
Despite these inconsistencies, there seem to be strong indications
that the Penal Code definition is the standard toward which the Court
is moving.50 It has been suggested, also, that the Court "may have been
trying to bring existing law up to the level of the Model Penal Code
by the tour de force of declaring that it was already there." 57
Even if the Court be said to have only indicated a qualified acceptance of the Model Penal Code definition and approach, it has nevertheless made clear that obscenity statutes must be so restricted that they
will not interfere with materials merely concerned with sex, that
obscenity and sex are not the same; obscenity is something more-the
appeal to "prurient interest" which goes beyond community standards
and is "utterly without redeeming social importance." Further, the
old restrictive Hicklin rule has been expressly rejected and allegedly
obscene materials must now be evaluated as a whole and their "dominant
theme" determined with reference to the average person, not the especially susceptible individual. How the Court's test will work out in ap"54

" Id. at 487, n. 20.
" Ibid.
11 Ibid., citing ALI MODEL PENlAL CODE § 207-10, comments, at 10 (Tent. Draft
No.6, 1957).
',Mr. justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion concurred in by Mr. Justice
Black, states that the Court's standard "in substance" seems to be the definition
of the Model Penal Code. However, he did not consider it valid because it "does
not require any nexus between the literature which is prohibited and action which
the legislature can regulate or prohibit." Equally invalid to him were the
standards applied by the lower courts in both cases because they "punish mere
speech or publication that the judge or jury thinks has an "undesirable impact
on thoughts but that is not shown to be a part of unlawful action.. . ." 354 U.S.
at 508-14.
Mr. Justice Harlan charged that "the Court compounds confusion" by superimposing the Model Penal Code definition on the two statutory definitions involved
in the cases. He did not feel that the definitions could be reconciled and
believed that the convictions should have been reversed if the American
Law Institute formula were the correct standard. He contended also that
each particular suppression of a publication as obscene involved a sensitive
question of constitutional judgment which in each case was the responsibility of an
appellate court. Upon making his own examination of the material involved in
Alberts, he concurred in affirming the conviction and concluded that suppression
of this material would not "so interfere with the communication of 'ideas' in any
proper sense of that term" that it would violate due process and the first amendment. In Roth, however, he dissented because of his view of the differences between state and federal power and the danger of a uniform national censorship
imposed by the federal government. He felt that Congress could only regulate
"'hard-core' pornography" and that the materials involved in the case were not
such. Id. at 496-508. See also note 49 supra.
"'Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B. Ass'N. Q. 8, 11 (1957).
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plication remains to be seen from future litigation, s but the present
decision would seem to be conducive to greater freedom of expression
in this area. In the meantime, North Carolina-a state which has apparently never had an obscenity case reach its highest court-stands in
the unique position of having an obscenity statute which, properly
applied,5 9 ranks with the most modem and liberal in the nation and
represents an acme toward which the law appears to be presently moving.
DAVID E. BUCKNER
Criminal Law-Assault on a Female-"Show of Violence"
Rule in North Carolina
In State v. Allen,1 the evidence tended to show that the defendant
followed prosecutrix in his automobile on several occasions as she
walked to a place on a public street where she customarily awaited her
ride to work, that the defendant stopped within a few feet of prosecutrix
but made no attempt to approach her or to communicate with her in
any way, that defendant gazed constantly at her, making motions with
the lower part of his body, and that because of fear of him, prosecutrix
quit walking the usual way to the place for her ride. These acts, on
the occasion before his arrest, caused prosecutrix to run to the steps of
a public school. This evidence was held sufficient to go to the jury in
a prosecution for assault on a female. 2
The principal case is the latest of several recent borderline cases of
assault on a female which have been brought before the North Carolina
Supreme Court, and it serves well to illustrate the difficult problem
confronting the court in determining whether or not the particular acts
of a defendant are sufficient in law to constitute the criminal offense.3
" In three per curiam decisions since the preparation of this Note, the Court has
struck down prohibitions on the mailing of magazines which lower courts had held
to be obscene, as well as a similar ban on the showing of a motion picture. In all
of these cases the Court relied upon its decision in the Roth case.
See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3204 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1958) reversbtg
241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (over-turning the lower court's affirmance of a postoffice ban on "One," a magazine concerned with homosexuality, on grounds that
it was obscene) ; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3204 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1958), reversing 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (nudist magazines,
Sunshine and Health and Sun Magazine, not excludable from the mails as obscene) ;
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th
Cir. 1957) (reversing Chicago censorship of the French motion picture "Game of
Love" on obscenity grounds). The Court's only explanation of these one-sentence
decisions was in its citation of the Roth case. Their inference, however, would seem
to be that the Court has imposed tight limits on permissible censorship for
obscenity. See also, Lewis, Censorsip Limited in 'Obscenity' Cases, The New
York Times, January 19, 1958, § E, p. 9, col. 6-8.
" See note 16 supra.
245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (1953).
Technically, assault on a female is not a specific type of assault, as the degrees
of assault specified by statute relate to the extent of punishment and do not create

